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Abstract
In contrast to what is commonly believed, the first article on rational
expectations was not written by Muth, neither did it appear in 1961. The
true prioriry goes to a neglected and forgotten article by Tinbergen,
published in 1932. The two articles have amazingly much in common. One
similarity is that neither of them caused an immediate breakthrough in
economics.
In this paper, I sketch the early developments of expectations analysis
in economics, show how different research programs progressed or halted,
and how different (technical as well as philosophical) problems hampered
progress. The paper also describes in short some later developments, how
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l. Introduction
Revolutions rarely come unannounced. The October Revolution in 1918
Russia was preceeded by the uprising in 1905; the Communist revolution ín
China had its roots in the Boxer war. The lndustrial Revolution has its
seeds in the agricultural changes of the late Middle Ages. Similarly,
scientific revolutions have a history that normally start long before the
decisive changes take place.
In Economics, the revoluttons that people like to call revolutions are
scarce. The marginalist revolution, the Keynesian revolution and recently
the Rational Expectations revolution are the few examples one can give.
The Rattonai Expectations Revo[utton !n Macroeconomics (see eg. Begg
1982) is a remarkable development in recent macroeconomic theory.
Remarkable, firstly, because of the force with which this revolution
changed macrceconomics ín the seventies and eighties, and secondly,
because the basic idea is so simple and natural that it is amazing that
this Revolution didn't take place much earlier. It is on the question:
why took it so long for this revolution to take off, that I will
concentrate my analysis.
A short history of The Revolution usually starts with John Muth's
Rattonal Expectattons and the Theory of Pr[ce Movements (1961). This was
basically a paper on micrceconomic price theory. The step to
macroeconomics was made roughly a decade later, by the 'revolutionaries'
Lucas, Sargent and Rapping.
This history is well known and described in different studies (see eg.
Begg (1982), or Klamer (1984)). It is much less known that a discussion
on 'rational expectations' in macroeconomics existed long before the work
of Lucas et. al., and even before Muth. This is one reason for writing a
paper on the 'prehistory' of rational expectations. This study then may
also shed some light on the reason for the rather slow take off of this
revolution. Mother reason is to see how different research programs of
the thirties went along and integrated.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a short descriptlon
of the Interbellum literature on expectations formation. Section 3
presents the first rational expectations model, formulated by Tinbergen3
in 1932. Section 4 goes into more detail to describe the contribution of
early statistical research. Section S deals with the Austrian economists,
as Morgenstern and Hayek. Section 6 pays attention to Keynes and his
disciples. Section 7 sketches the steps to Muth, in particular the
development in game theory and topology. Section 8 reads Muth's artlcle
in the light of the preceeding, and finally section 9 shows how progress
led to the integration of different lines of thought that existed in the
thirties.
2. Different Programs in the Thirtiea.
In the following sections 1 will describe different approaches to the
analysis of expectations as they existed in the prewar years. Before
studying each of them separately, it is useful to summarise them and
sketching the context of these approaches.
Until the Second World War Vienna was a very important place for
economics, with economists as Hayek, Mises and Morgenstern and
philosophers like Popper setting the stage. Vienna was the place were the
anti-predtctivists were dominant. Particularly Morgenstern was active in
attacking the idea that economics should be used for predicting the
future.
This attack was partly directed to the use of so called barometers for
prediction, or what Koopmans later dubbed the 'measurement without
theory' approach. Statisticians at various places tried to predict stock
market prices, but also analysed their own (lack of) success in this.
Their tool was not yet multiple correlation, but in another context, i.e.
estimating demand curves and the like, this technique started to be used.
Tinbergen was the first and, until some thirty years later, only one who
made the link between dynamic theory, expectations and uncertainty, and
probability theory. This lead him naturally to a model of rational
expectations, and raises two mysteries: firstly, why no one today knows
of his contribution, secondly, why his contempories did not pick up his
idea.
Then there is economic theory in England. The phrase 'it is all ln4
Marshall' dces not really apply to the analysis of expectations in
economic theory. As Shackle (1967, p. 6) notes, "Marshall, as always, was
with the angels, but he did not blow this particular trumpet very loud".
Perhaps the first effort among the English economists to deal explicltly
with expectations was made by Keynes, in the General Theory. Apart from
its well known importance as a book on disequilibrium economics, it
contains interesting remarks on expectations, and particularly on the
relation between uncertainty and disequilibrium.
Another economist who contributed to the literature on expectations and
information was, after leaving Vienna, Hayek. Hls perspective was very
different from Keynes's: the problem that kept Hayek busy was what he
called the division of knowledge and its relation with equlltbrtum
isstead of disequilibrium. This he found much more intriguing than
Smith's well known division of labour.
In the following I will first discuss Tinbergen's work. Next comes the
statistical- empirical literature coming from agricultural economists and
stock market analysists. Keynes's scattered theoretical remarks are
analysed subsequently, followed by the works of Morgenstern and Hayek.
3. Tinbergen and The Introduction of Rational Expectations
One of the most remarkable episodes during the prehistory of rational
expectations is Tinbergen's contribution: out of nothing he introduced by
far the most sophisticated analysis of expectations formation of his
time. His 1932 paper, Ein Problem der Dynamik, is the first that
explicitly uses rational expectations, but it disappeared under the dust
of history . The fact that the paper is written in German is one of the
probable reasons why no attention was paid to this paper in the
anglo-saxon literature. But also a paper in the first volume of
Econometrica, in which some of the ideas in the German paper are
repeated, dId not shock the world of quantitative economists. The papers
were completely forgotten in 1961, when Muth reinvented rational
expectations.
Tinbergen started with the formulation of a stochastic dynamic
optimization problem (his doctoral thesis dealt with optimizing problemss
in physics and economics). Note that Bellman's Principle of Optimality
was not yet invented, stochastic dynamic optimisation techniques were not
available. New concepts were required, and Tinbergen made an effort to
fill the lacune.
The first concept that Tinbergen introduced was the time horizon
('Gesichtsfeld') and a degree of time preference (Bi7hm-Bawerk's
'perspektivische Verkleinerung'). In principle, Tinbergen agreed, the
time horizon could be unbounded, but for simplicity, a finite horizon was
assumed, denoted by t.
The second important concept was expectatIons ('Erwartungen'). Of
course, this concept was not new, but the way Tinbergen formulated it
certainly was. As Tinbergen noted, in a dynamic problem there is the
inherent problem that some future variables are unknown to the economic
agents. Therefore, ihey need to form expectations on, e.g., future prices
and harvests. For simplicity, Tinbergen assumed that these expectations
are equal among different individuals. The next, most interesting
assumption, is that these expectations are rationa[ ('vernUnftig'):
"The in my opinion essential characteristic of 'expectations' is not
yet eliminated: that is that they don't have to become reality when new
facts that were, and had to be, unknown until that moment, have an
influence on these expectations. Therefore, we will go a step further,
and assume also, that these expectations are 'rational', i.e. are
consistent with the economic relationships" (1932, p. 172; the latter
sentence reads in the original: "Wir werden sogar noch einer Schritt
weiter gehen and auch annehmen, daB die Erwartungen 'verniinftig' sind,
d.h. mit den wirtsschaftlichen Zusammenh~ngen Ubereinstimmen.").
Gompare Muth: "I should like to suggest that expectations, since they are
Informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the
predictions of the relevant economic theory. (...) we call such
expectations 'rational'" (Muth 1961, p. 4). Tinbergen continues:
[n certain cases - which probably will be the most fruitful ones for
analysis - one can replace these 'expectations' by economic-theoretical
deductions (durch wtrtschajtstheoretischen Deduktton), certain
constants or real variables. For example, in case of a random variable,
the rational expectation is the mathematical expectation (so tst d[e
vernUnjtige Erwartung dte mathematische) and therefore a certain
constant. Another example is a variable that is the realisation of a
certain law, to some degree of approximation. This expectation can be
replaced by a series, in which the current value of the varlable and
its derivatives with respect to time are used." (p. 172)6
And compare Muth again: "The hypothesis can be rephrased a little more
precisely as follows: that expectatons of firms (or, more generally, the
subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend to be distributed,
for the same information set, about prediction of the theory (or the
'objective' probability distribution of outcomes)." (Muth, op.cit. p. 5).
The language used by Tinbergen remarkably resembles that of Muth.
Especially if the Wirtscha,fttheorettschen Deduktion is translated by 'the
relevant economic theory', which is obviously what is meant by Tínbergen.
Before being able to introduce his model, he needed a third concept:
laRs (Verzágerungen) coming from natural and technical factors. The
problem analysed in Tinbergen's simple model then takes the following
form. An individual makes an economic plan for his demands and supplies,
given (1) a utility or profit function, (2) the time horizon, and (3),
the price expectations. The plans of individuals can be conflicting or
mutually inconsistent. This results in excess demand vectors, X(p). The
equilibrium condition for period t is defined as Xt(pt) - 0, i.e. excess
demands are zero. Therefore, equilibrium realisations are mutually
consistent.
Tinbergen applied this framework to a slmple mathematical model of
production and inventory allocation, in which demand was deterministic
(for simplicity), and supply stochastic. Again compare the analysis of
Muth: his (Muth's) notation is somewhat more pleasant, but the model is
nearly identical. Demand is non-stochastic, supply contains an
expectatoinal and a random component, market equilibrium is determined by
an equality between demand and supply. Muth analyses a model with and
without inventory speculation, a slight extension compared to Tinbergen
who didn't discuss the model without inventory speculation. To further
simplify the problem, Tinbergen restricted the time horizon to two
periods, but Iater on in the article this was generalised to any horizon.
The conclusions Tinbergen draw from his model with rational
expectations do not in any way foreshadow modern insights, such as the
differences between anticipated versus unanticipated shocks, Lucas's
critique etc. The article did not differ from Muth's in this. But his
empirical illustration, presented in the beginning of his article, may
have warranted Tinbergen's feeling that current realisations are fairly
good forecasts of future realised prices. This conclusion stems from7
comparing future prices with realised prices. In 1933 an article in
Econometrica appeared: The Notion of Horizon and Expectancy in Dynamtc
Economics. In this article, the model of 1932 is shortly repeated, but
instead of 'rational', Tinbergen translated 'vernllnftig' with the word
'reasonable'. A more or less unrelated section in this article deals with
the relation between dividend paid and the 'worth' of stocks. The
ques[ion that Tinbergen posed was on what factors dividend expectations
depend. The conclusion is that "The chief determinant factor (... ) is the
last dívidend paid" (p. 261). Tinbergen concludes that there no
"forecasting quality" of stock prices. The results are close to the
modern random walk hypothesis of stock prices (see Granger and
Morgenstern 1970).
[n his later work in building dynamic macroeconomic models Tinbergen
never refered to his theory of rational expectations. Expected profit was
an important factor in his empirical explanation for investment, but no
use was made of a rational expectations theory to defend the use of
profit and profit lagged as proxies for expected profit (see Tinbergen
1937, p. 25: "It could be asked whether profit expectations rather than
past profits should be considered as determinants of investment. In
principle this is no doubt correct, but it seems to me that the chief
factors in expectations are the actual profits that have been made.").
Other sources for dynamics in his models, such as natural and
technological production lags (such as pig breeding or ship building)
were analysed extensively in other contributions of Tinbergen, the total
of these studies in dynamic issues lead Tinbergen to being confident
using different lag structures in his macrceconometric models.
The impact of the article, and its idea, on his contemporaries remained
low. This mystery asks for an explanation. One such explanation is that
quantitative economists were still hard to find, and few of them read
German. There was, however, an English version of some of the notions in
E[n Problem der Dynamik in Econometrica: i.e. the 1933 article mentioned
above, but what there was called 'reasonable expectations' was only one
issue out of a whole range discussed by Tinbergen, and anyway the
analysis was less general. No mention was made of 'mathematical
expectation', for example.
Furthermore, apparently the jump from probability theory to economic8
expectations and forecasting was too big for Tinbergen's contemporaries.
First of all, even among statistical researchers, such as those that
will be analysed below, probability theory was a relatively obscure
topic. Uiagrams and the like were much more generally used than multiple
correlation. l'hose who estimated demand functions were not sufficiently
interested in dynamic economics to follow Tinbergen: their own research
program was flourishing and interesting enough. And finally, someone like
Keynes, who was very familiar with probability theory (although not as
much with multiple correlation) objected to the use of mathematical
expectations for economic forecasts (see also below). Keynes (as well as
Morgenstern) had a fair point: how should one deal with expectations of
expectations, and the problem of infinite regress. It was not until the
development of game theory, decision theory and the advances in classical
and Bayesian probability theory that one could start to provide solutions
to such questions. Tinbergen, in some sense, was ahead of his time. He
was aware of Morgenstern's critique on economic forecasting (viz. a
review, in Dutch, of Morgenstern's book Wirtschaftsprognose (1928) in De
Economist, 1929), but remained unconvinced by Morgenstern's critique
thanks to a rather pragmatic attitude. Thirty years later, Muth neglected
this issue as well. The difference with Tinbergen is that he could have
known better.
4. The Statisticians
During the prewar years statistical research in economícs started to
become increasingly important. One of the most interesting research areas
was expectations, and the first statisticians made an effort to use their
statistical methods for economic forecasts.
Among those statisticians there were two groups that can be
distinguished. First of all the agricultural ones, who among other things
(as estimating demand functions) were interested in analysing the
dynamics of agricultural prices. The hog cycle (or pig cycle, and
related, the cobweb model) was the key issue for these empirical
economists.
The second group consisted of stock market analysists. Good forecasts9
could be used for stock market trading, and in fact Econometrica gained
its existence in 1932 because of the anxiety of the President of an
investment counseling firm to improve his predictions of stock market
prices (this man was, of course, Alfred Cowles, see Hildreth (1986)).
Interestingly enough, neither of these groups applied probabiltty
theory to their investigations. Statistics meant presenting data,
sometimes summarizing them in 'barometers' and diagrams, but the bridge
to probability theory, as it was first built by Tinbergen, remained
unused.
An example of the first line of research, the agricultural, is that of
Coase and Fowler, who analysed the pig-cycle in Britian. Hanau (1930) did
similar work for Germany, and in 1931 Tinbergen analysed a shipbuílding
cycle. The pig-cycle was popular among agricultural economists to explain
the movements in agricultural prices, in other words, to study dynamics.
Coase and Fowler however the implications of the cobweb theorem more
carefully than was done before. They rejected the view, "commonly held by
agrícultural economists (... ) that farmers assume that present prices and
costs will continue unchanged in the future" (1937, p. 55). A major
reason for rejecting the cobweb theorem is that "if farmers acted
according to the assumptions of the 'cobweb theorem', the technical
conditions are such that a cycle of about two years would arise" (1937,
p. 77), whereas the observed cycle was much longer than two years, and
furthermore, the period and amplitude of the cycle were found to be
unstable.
Another critique they gave is that "if farmers acted in the way
postulated by the 'cobweb theorem', the cycle of prices when it had
arisen would persist even though the supply and demand curves remained
unchanged." (1937, p. 79). This is not how farmers act: it would not bc
rational to do so (Coase and Fowler don't use the word rational,
howeverl. Their analysis was less formal than Muth's, but contains most
of his points.
The explanation for the cycle given then by Coase and Fowler was:
"The cycle arises because of errors in forecasting on the part of
farmers, and we have shown that it is impossible to find any simple and
rigid relationship which will explain the course of the cycle. (...)
Since farmers are slow to change their estimates of future prices and
since, as we have already argued, farmers cannot be expected to
estimate correctly, it follows that errors will persist over a period
of some years. Apparently, however, there is a tendency for this period
to shorten. One or both of two factors may be operative to bring this10
about. One factor is that farmers may learn from experience and thus
correct errors more quickly and tend to be more accurate in their
forecasting. The other is, of course, that farmers who persistently
make bad forecasts will make losses and will tend to turn to
alternative occupations". (1937, p. 79).
But, in contrast to what modern rational expectations analysts like to
think, "the rate at which farmers learn from experience (... ) would
appear to be a problem lying rather within the province of the
psychologist than that of the economist" (p. 79). Would they have made a
different statement, had they known of Tinbergen's effort to analyse
expectations? Apparantly, they were not familiar with his contribution
(no reference is made, neither to the German, nor to the Econometrica
article). Furthermore, they didn't seem to be very familiar with
probability theory, which would have been a necessary condition for an
own invention of a theory of rational expectations.
Another study of the cobweb cycle is Ezekiel (1938). In a certain sense
this is a step back compared with Coase and Fowler: although Ezekiel
refered to their work, he completely ignored their empirical and
analytical criticism of the cobweb theorem. Ezekiel even extended the
application of the cobweb theorem to macroeconomic analysis:
"Even under the conditions of pure competition and static demand and
supply, there is thus no 'automatic self-regulating mechanism', which
can provide full utilisation of resources. Unemployment, excess
capacity, and the wasteful use of resources may occur even when all the
competetive assumptions are fulfilled." (Ezekiel 1938, p. 279).
It is this kind of analysis that is rejected by the modern rational
expectations economists, first by Muth. Again, we may wonder why Ezekiel
did what he did, and didn't better. He certalnly could have known: he
referred to Coase and Fowler, the least thing he could have done is to
tell why he didn't care about their criticism. Maybe the answer is
simple: Ezekiel thought he made a point by showing that disequilibrium
resulted from the cobweb. The fact that he observed disequilibrium in
economics may have been a validation for his neglect of the earller
critique on the cobweb theorem. This explanation seems to be too simple,
but it is hard to think of a better one.
A study that combined agriculture and the stock market, is Dow (1941)
from the University of Manchester, who investigated the accuracy ofI1
expectations by looking at the Liverpool cotton futures market.
Dow compared cotton future prices with theír final realisations, and
noted that both present and future prices are "determined by
expectations, which are the best that can be made on the data available
at the time" (Dow op.cit., p. 165; compare Muth, quoted above). He
concluded that "In the Liverpool cotton market, speculation is not very
successful in forecasting prices in the future. On the other hand, it is
not completely wide of the mark; changes in expectations cause a
readjustment of the system of prices in the market, and these
readjustments tend on the whole be in the right direction rather than
not." (Dow, op.cit., p. 171). Again a result that foreshadows current
research on rational expectations and efficient markets, but again
probability theory is not among the tools used by Dow.
Fínally, there were the pure stock market analists. One of them is
Karsten, Director of Research of the Karsten Statistical Laboratory. He
has written a handbook for the stockbroker: Sctenti,fic Forecasting Cits
methods and application to practical busines and to stock market
operationsJ. In this book he mainly relied on the techniques of
'barometers' (also used by the NBER (see for a modern account Dominguez
et.al., 1988)).
Karsten was fairly optimistic about his abilities to make prognoses,
but, as he had to admit (1931, p. 23), "at the present time this
investigation can not account for economic changes which are wholly due
to the element of mob-, crowd- or herd-psychology". In general, however,
Karsten's conclusion is that these psychological factors are relatively
unimportant, which leads him to find reason to state that his resluts
support "economic determinism". There is only one exception: the stock
market (op.cit., p. 26). Of course it is not surprising that Karsten was
moderate with claims about stock market prediction, so shortly after the
generally unexpected crash of 1929.
Alfred Cowles contributed a paper to the first volume of Econometrica,
in which he discussed the question "Can Stock Market Forecasters
Forecast?". His answer was rather negative: financial consultancy firms
did not forecast better on average than pure chance. Cowles thought that
this provided a ground for more research in statistics and prediction,
not that the effort would be logical impossible. So, he spend a good12
amount of money to support the new Econometric Society, and his "Cowles
Commission for Research in Economics".
The kind of work of Karsten and the NBER was vigorously attacked by
Morgenstern. Also Popper, using a more philosophical approach, strongly
critisised this kind of determinism (Popper 1957). It is to this critique
that I will turn now.
5. The Austrians: Morgenstern and Hayek
The Austrian School of economics has some fame for its dismissal of the
use of mathematics and statistics in economics. It is therefore maybe not
surprising that one of the leading economists of Vienna during the
thirties consistently critisised the use of statistical techniques for
forecasting (by the way, some fourty years later he wrote a book with
Clive Granger on stock market forecasting, in which the random walk
hypothesis of stock prices is reassessed).
The economist we are talking about is Oskar Morgenstern, professor at
the University of Vienna and Director of the Austrian Institute for Trade
Cycle Research. In his book The Limits of Economics (1937, p. 87), he
wrote:
"(...) instead of developing economic statistics, aided by the
eagerness of the present generation, in such a way as to derive
permanent utility from them, the economists have gone to extremes and
have betaken themselves to the dangerous field of economic prognosis. I
myself was perhaps one of the first among the very few who protested
sharply against this abuse of science."
Here Morgenstern refered to his Wirtschafis'Prognose (1928). In that
book, he discussed what Popper later called the 'Oedipus Effect' (Popper
1957, p. 131. This is the effect that a prophecy or forecast may have on
the outcome: selffulfilling or selfdenying. According to Morgenstern,
this effect is a decisive logical refutation of any aspirations of makíng
economic forecasts. At best, no one listen to the forecast (in which case
Morgenstern's critique is invalid, by the way), but at worst people do
take into account the forecast, start speculating, and cause erratic and
strong disturbances in the economic proces. Popper (also raised in
Vienna!), for similar reasons, denied the possibility of social13
prediction in his Poverty oj Historicism.
This problem was certainly not unimportant. [n fact, a refutation of
the logical impossibility of prediction had to wait till after the war
(see section 7, below). Morgenstern remained interested by the problem,
this interest helped him in developing (with Von Neumann) game theory.
Morgenstern (1937) somewhat differs in its critique on predictivism
from Morgenstern (1928). The latter emphasised the logical impossibility
of forecasting, whereas (1937) seems to direct its criticism against the
barometer or NBER methodology: the 'measurement without theory' approach.
This seems apparant from the following quote:
"The most serious misuse which has been made of business cycle research
are the attempts of 'scientific', detailed 'economic prognosis'. These
have been made on the basis of an attitude which is antitheoretical
and, consequently, entirely misguided as to the uses of statistics, and
have rested on the appeal to a completely mistaken empiricism. It must
be emphasized, to avoid misunderstanding at the outset, that the kind
of prognosis to which objection is made does not of course include that
which is implicitly made when any particular theorem is being applied
to a concrete case under the strict assumption of ceteris paribus. This
kind of prognosis takes place in every science that has any connection
with empirical events; it raises no empirical problem as long as it
proves possible to isolate the initial conditions and so long as there
is assurance that the latter do actually remaln constant throughout the
period under consideration. In this case it is simply a question of the
application of scientific analysis pure and simple: thts situation is
the smae for all sciences."
Another economist from Vienna was Friedrich Hayek. His most interesting
contributions to the problem of expectations and information date however
from his LSE period.
Hayek (1937) was interested in a problem analogous to Smith's division
of labour: the dtvision of knowledge. The latter concerns the problem of
"(...) how the spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each
possessing only bits of knowledge, brings about a state of affairs in
which prices correspond to costs, etc., and which could be brought
about by deliberate direction only by somebody who possessed the
combined knowledge of all those individuals." (op.cit., p. 49).
Hayek continued
"(... ) instead of showing what bits of information the
different persons must possess in order to bring about that result, we
fall in effect back on the assumption that everybody knows everything
and so evade any real solution of the problem."
Hayek was critical of economists who14
"(...) stress only the need of knowledge of prices, apparently because
- as a consequence of the confusions between objective and subjective
data- the complete knowledge of the objective tacts was taken for
granted. In recent times even the knowledge of current prices has been
taken so much for granted that the only connection in which the
question of knowledge has been regarded as problematic has been the
anticipation of future prices." (p. 49 - 50).
For Hayek, price expectations were just a minor part of the problem of
knowledge, the major part being the general question of why the
subjective data to the different persons correspond to the objective
facts.
These questions are indeed the most interesting ones, and remain even
today largely unresolved. Hayek made an important contribution by raising
these issues, without even beginning to propose any solution. Morgenstern
also was unable to go deeper than pointing to the basic problem of
predictivism. i~he theory of games, to which he turned later, would prove
to be of major importance in answering the problems that could not be
solved in the thirties. Phelps's theory of islands set into motion a
modern research program, heir of Hayek's analysis.
6. Keynes and his environment
According to the Post-Keynesian school of economic thought, Keynes's
major contribution to economic theory was not the analysis of an economy
with tixed prices (as mainstream neoclassical synthesis suggests), but
his introduction of uncertainty into economics. Indeed, the General
Theory contains many references to expectations. A number of these give
the impression that Keynes already foreshadowed the Rational Expectations
literature and the literature on what we call today 'speculative
bubbles'. However, it is very hard to argue that Keynes really had more
of a theory of expectations formation than, for example, Karsten. I won't
argue that expectations were unimportant in the General Theory (as
Haberler seems to think, see below), but rather that Keynes's theory of
expectations amounts to the statement that such a theory is impossible.
Chapter 12 of the General Theory discusses 'The state of long term
expectation'. It is full of quoteworthy remarks, I will try to restrainIS
myself. Of course, one has to start with the famous beauty contest:
"It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's
judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average
opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third
degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average
opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I
believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees." Keynes
1936, p. 156)
The modern reader sees that Keynes tried to find a fixed point, or,
tried to show that such a point was impossible to find in case of
speculation. Even today, the literature on speculative bubbles does not
provide an exhaustive solution to this problem, Keynes's worry certainly
was warranted. But his analysís also deals with the non- speculative
case. It is simply human nature that would invalidate the impossibility
of a mathematical treatment of expectations:
"Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the
instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large
proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optímism
rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic
or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive,
the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to
come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits - of a
spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome
of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by
quantitative probabilities." (p. 161)
On the next page:
"In estiming the prospects of investment, we must have regard,
therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and
reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it
largely depends.
"We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves of
irrational psychology. On the contrary, the state of long term
expectation is often steady, and, even when it is not, the other
factors exert their compensating effects. We are merely reminding
ourselves that human decisions affecting the future, whether personal
or political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical
expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not
exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity which makes the
wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives
as best as we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling
back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance." (p. 162-3).
Haberler (1937, p. 253) remarks that:
"Mr. Keynes has, of course, much to say on the formation of expectatons
and the difficulties and limítations confronting any theory on this
subject. But all this is contained in the wealth of remarks,
observations and obiter dicta which - elaborating, supportíng,
illustrating and, at times, contradicting and blurring - surround the16
main outline of his theory: the dynamic aspects do not penetrate the
heart of his theory."
This view of Haberler is rather objectionable. lndeed, Keynes did not
provide a theory of expectatior,s formation, but Keynes suggests that this
is even a logical impossibility. The way expectations do enter the heart
of his theory is not affected by this. A reading of Keynes's QJE (1937)
article, The General Theory oj Empioyment, shows that this j~undamental
(not calculable) uncertainty of the future drives his theory of
investment and liquidity preference, and therefore the whole General
Theory (in fact, it is this problem that also is the ground reason for
Keynes's objection to Tinbergen's econometric work). It is not the object
of this paper, however, to enter the exegetical debate on the 'real'
heart of Keynes's theory.
Keynes's hesitation with using probability for economic analysis dates
back to the Treatise on Probabi[ity (1921). In this work, Keynes argued
against a frequentist (or aleatory) theory of probability. [nstead, he
prefered an objective epistemic theory of probability, where probability
relates to a degree of belief. From this he derived a Iogical theory of
induction. A much more complicated matter was to formulate a statistical
theory of induction, or inductive correlation. This struggle can be found
in Part V of the Treatise, on The Foundations of Statistical Inference.
Keynes kept on arguing that probabilities cannot be aleatory:
"Statistical technique tells us how to 'count' the cases when we are
presented with complex material. It must not proceed also, except in
the exceptional case where our evidence furnishes us from the outset
with data of a particular kind, to turns its results into
probabilities; not, at any rate, if we mean by probability a measure of
rational belief." (Keynes 1921, p. 428).
At the end of the Treatise, Keynes acknowledges that if stable relative
frequencies could be found, than there would be a"remarkable, if
undeserved, justification of some of the methods of the traditional
calculus of probabilities." (Keynes (1921), p. 468).
In the General Theory, Keynes hardly refered back to the Treatise. A
former pupil of him however filled the gap, and in fact was closer to an
analytical treatment of economic expectations than Keynes himself in the
General Theory. Tis man was Hugh Townshend. Townshend, after taking a
first in math in Cambridge (1912), had been a pupil of Keynes while
preparing for civil service examinations in 1914. In the thirties he
worked at the British Post Office, where he was involved in short and17
medíum term forecasting of the Post Office Telephone revenue ( see his
letter to Keynes in Keynes (1973, p. 247), and the note by the editor of
the CW, Moggridge, on p. 235).
The published work of Townshend only consists of a few book reviews in
the Economic Journal from 1937 to 1939, and one 'note' (really an
article) in the EJ (1937). Apart from this note and reviews a number of
letters from and to Keynes survive. More than Keynes did, he tried to
find out whether it is possible to find some constructive theory of
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on Probability. A few hínts appear in the Economic Journal book reviews.
In the review of Shackle's Expectations, Investment and Income
(Townshend 19381, Townshend critisises Shackle:
"(...) if this is correct, it is fundamental - I do not feel sure that
the treatment of an economic expectation as uniquely correlated with a
value will stand logical analysis without modification. For example,
Mr. Shackle's concept of 'equivalent certainties', ingenious and
interesting as it is, seems to me to imply that the weight of evidence
subjectively associated with a judgement of probability can be
expressed numerically as a probability of a(numerical) probability.
The logical objections to this view have been pointed out by Mr. Keynes
in his Treatise on Probability." (Townshend 1938, p. 523).
The review of Hawtrey's Capttal and E'mployment again provides a
critisism in the Keynesian mode. First, Townshend describes how Hawtrey
assumes that producers perfectly right decisions. Then:
"This , of cours, is a condition of equilibrium, from which Mr.
Hawtrey, following (in this at least) a tradition common to both the
Cambridge and the Austrian schools, proceeds to develop a dynamic
theory, 'taking account of disturbances' which clearly include those
due to promoters failing to take perfectly right decisions. But it is
logically necessary to any such theory that the position of equilibrium
should be capable of existing. Ij Mr. Keynes is right, there is no
unique se1 oj perjectly right decisions. For the most profitable
decision for one producer depends on what others, including consumers,
do; and what they do depends on what he expects to happen. There is of
course a'right decision' for any one producer, in the sense of the
course which will maximise his profits if the others (and the
consumers) do what he expects them to do on the best information
available to him. (... ) The mechanical analogy (e.g. of Virtual Work,
which Mr. Hawtrey cites from Jevons) breaks down; as it surely must, if
prices are influenced, through-liquidity premium, by mere expectations.
(If one must have a mechanical analogy, I suggest the case of the
impossibility of applying the general Hamiltonian equations to solve a
problem in dynamics where the system includes non-homologous forces!)."
ln a letter to Keynes, dated November 25th, 1938, he again wondered
whether it would be possible to surmount the logical problem of finding18
nurt~erical probabilities for fundamentally uncertain factors. The letter
is a response to a letter of Keynes, 27 July 1938, in which Keynes
writes:
"(...) a main point to which 1 would call your attention is that, on my
theory of probability, the probabilities themselves, quite apart from
their weight or value, are not numerical." (in Keynes 1979, p. 289).
i'hc letter that Townshend writes is interesting from the beginning to
the end, but its essence comes through ín a few final paragraphs:
"This is the nearest I can get to an analysis of the part played by the
t actor oi conf idence in the rauonate ot mterest. t beiteve tnat tts
further logical analysis at a deeper level of generalisation is
connected with the part played by the weight of evidence in your theory
of probability; but I cannot see just how. The connection in my mind
comes about through the contrast with the conditions of the
mathematical theory of probability appropriate to timeless games of
chance, where in some way conditons not indefi.nitely repeatable are
abstracted from. But this is probably unintelligible. (...) All this,
of course, leaves open the question whether , as you suggest in your
letter, it may not be possible to develop a logical doctrine of
equivalent certainties free from the assumption of numerical
probabilities, and perhaps of wider than economic application. I am
only maintaining that this has not yet been done. It also leaves out of
account the element of arbitrariness in judgements of probability, to
which you refer. I think that this last, in its economic aspect, really
implies a criticism, or at least calls for further analysis, of the
basic concept of the economic man, defined as determinately motivated
by (his) judgements of maximum (in some sense) anticipated
profitability." (Townshend, in: Keynes (1979), p. 292-293).
In a final reaction, Keyne.s (1979, p. 294) writes:
"1 think it important to emphasise the point that all this is not
particularly an economic problem, but affects every rational choice
concerning conduct where consequences enter into the rational
calculation. Generally speaking, in making a decision we have before us
a large number of alternatives, none of which is demonstrably more
'rational' than the others, in the sense that we can arrange in order
of inerit the sum aggregate of the benefíts obtainable from the complete
consequences of each. To avoid being in the position of Buridan's ass,
we fall back, therefore, and necessarily do so, on motives of another
kind, which are not 'rational' in the sense of being concerned with the
evaluation of consequences, but are decided by habit, instinct,
preference, desire, will, etc. All this is just as true of the
non-economic as of the economic man."
Keynes, this is clear, would not easily accept a rational expectations
hypothesis in economics. His pupil, Townshend, was a bit more open mínded
but he was unable to provide a solution to the logical problem of finding
numerical probabilities of probabilities. Techniques were a major
constraint to analysis in the thirties.19
One point still is interesting to discuss. A constructive theory of
expectations formation existed, i.e. Tinbergen's model. What would Keynes
and Townshend have thought of this model? Neither of them ever refered to
Ein Probíem der Dynamik, or to the English article in Econometrica.
Keynes's attitude to Tinbergen's econometric work is all too well known,
however. He was horrified. fie had a number of reasons for his objections,
not all of them equally valid. One point, however, was fundamental, and
can be related to his ideas in the Treatise on Probability. That is his
doubt, cited above, that economic time series represented stable relative
frequencies: "the main prima facie objection to the application of the
method of multiple correlationto complex economic problems lies in the
apparent lack of any adequate degree of uniformity in the environment"
(Keynes 1973, p. 316). [n a certain sense, Keynes even anticipated
Lucas's critique, in accusing Tinbergen that he destroyed the tools of
the economist. A model should be used to change the nature of the data,
teh economy, and therefore never can represent a part of a stable
relative frequency.
Townshend was probably completely unaware of Tinbergen's work, as may
be expected from an amateur economist. But it may be that Townshend would
have been more impressed by tests (provided by Tinbergen in his
econometric work) on stability of a model, and by the original
rational expectations idea of Tinbergen. These notions remain entirely
speculative, though.
7. Game Theory and a Fixed Point Theorem
T'wo developments, or new inventions, enabled the next generation of
economists in thelr analysis of expectations. The first is due to Von
Neumann and Morgenstern: The Theory oj Games and E'conomic Behaviour,
published in 1944 (Von Neumann already had an article on game theory, in
German, in 1928). The second development, not completely unrelated, was
the advance in mathematical techniques (many of them existed already for
some time, but it took time before economists started to make use of
them).20
ln 1954 Modiglíani and Grunberg published a paper that used insights
from topology that just became known to economists during that period.
More precisely, they used Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem to prove the
existence of a solution of the problem of correct public prediction. This
theorem was well known among mathematicians since the beginning of the
century, but it was not until John von Neumann used it in his model of
general economic equilibrium (Revíew of Economic Studies, XII, 1945-46)
that economists started to use it. According to the opening footnote of
S7edig:iar.i and rrunberg. Herber. cime~ ar.ended the.n to rhe ~oss:bil?ty
of using Brouwer's Theorem for their problem.
This article was the first to make use of the new mathematical
techniques in solving an expectational problem. The article is more
fundamental than Muth's or Tinbergen's, in that Modigliani and Grunberg
show that it is, at least in principle, possible to do what Tinbergen and
Muth tacitly assumed that would be possible. The higher order
expectations, that Keynes worried about, could be analysed using the new
concepts of game theory and topology.
8. Muth's Article
In 1961 after all, Muth published his article ín Econometrica. He noted
"It is rather surprising that expectations have not previously been
regarded as rational dynamíc models, since rationality is assumed in all
other aspects of entrepreneurial behavior" (1961, p. 17). As should be
clear now, it is not surprising that this is the case, but it is
surprising that the analysis along these lines remained unnoticed until
today.
It is not the object of this paper to present Muth's model again.
Instead, more interesting questions to be discussed are: how close was
Muth to his predecessors, and how comes that, like Tinbergen, his article
did not result in an immediate breakthrough.
In section 3 it was already shown that, conceptually, Muth was
amazingly close to Tinbergen. One even wonders whether he was able to
read German, but this is very improbable, as Muth gives credit to other
sources where he can. Anyway, Muth's article is more sophisticated than21
Tinbergen's: his use of probability theory is much more subtle, and he
provides an interesting comparison of different dynamic models. His
contribution remains immense. But, like Tinbergen, Muth ignored some
important problems, on the other hand, there are other items that Muth
did not neglect: for example by providing theoretical support to Coase
and Fowler, and critisizing Ezekiel.
But now the points Muth neglected. Firstly, he made only one reference
to Grunberg and Modigliani, by noting that "A 'public prediction', in the
sense of Grunberg and Modigliani (1954), will have no substantial effect
on the operation of the economic system" (1961, p. S). Modigliani and
Grunberg however only show that correct public prediction is possible if
the possibility of correct private prediction is accepted (see Grunberg
and Modigliani 1954, p. 478, where they also anticipate, in a footnote,
Lucas's critique). Muth more or less took for granted that this does not
gives any problem, he was not bothered by any game theoretic problems.
Also, Hayek's preoccupation with diffuse knowledge is not discussed. Of
course, an exhaustive treatment of all these topics would have been far
from feasible for one article by one person. An avalange of papers was
waiting, but first some years had to pass by. As McCloskey (1985) shows,
the citations of the 1961 article numbered 5 in 1966, 3 in 1967, 2 in
1968 and 1969 and only then started to become more frequent. At that
point of time, Lucas and his cooperators took over the banner and caused
the final take off of the Rational Expectatons Revolution.
9. Epilogue: The Convergence of Research Programs
In the preceeding sections I sketched the developments in analysis of
expectations from the '30s onwards. Different programs developed, but to
a large degree they ignored each other. Tinbergen, in his somewhat
technical and pragmatic approach, didn't pay attention to philosophical
problems, such as the mere posslbt[ity of prediction and existence of
rational expectations. This was a focal point for Keynes, who denied such
a possibility. Also learning, something that attracted Hayek's attention,
is a neglected issue in Tinbergen's work.
But conversely, neither Keynes nor Hayek refer to the empirical work as22
done by the statisticians. Arguments in Coase and Fowler that refer to
learning were ignored. Keynes's arguments do not show up in Hayek's work,
neither seemed Keynes to be interested in the troubles of his Austrian
collegue.
The introduction of new techniques made new developments possible. For
example, economists started to become familiar with topology and game
theory in the late fourties. Savage (1954) gave an impulse to
probability theory and decision under uncertainty. And other ideas and
techninues became available. Thev were needed to solve some of the old
problems. In this sense, Tinbergen was too early with his ratonal
expectations. Muth appeared not much less ignorant than Tinbergen on
issues like these, however. There is no reference to any game theoretical
argument in his writing. Learning is not necessary in his model (similar
to Tinbergen: the agents know the economic model).
The big advantage Muth had, compared with Tinbergen, is that he was not
as much ahead of his time, for game theory, Bayesian learning and
statistical decision theory developed quickly in the postwar years, and
with some lags, entered economic theory. The conditions for the
revolution were not ripe in 1932, they were hardly ripe in 1961, but they
were ripe at about 1970. This is the moment that the different research
programs were able to meet each other, and to start the cross
fertilisation that resulted in models like presented in Frydman and
Phelps (1983).
One issue, worth studying, remained undiscussed in this paper. How well
does the history of rational expectations fit within notions of
philosophers of science, such as Lakatos's Research Programs,
progressivity, growth; or Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions? This
question is worth a sepatate paper, that [ hope to write in due time.23
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